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METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN DURBAN 
PREFACE 
This working paper describes research conducted during the second halt of 
1989 on the question of metropolitan and local government in Durban. The paper 
comprises two separate sections. 
The first section which is written by Simon Bekker, delineates three distinct strategies 
which could be followed to establish a metropolitan government in the Durban 
Functional Region. 
The second section reports on a survey aimed at establishing where support for each of 
these stratsgies is found. Opinions of local authority councillors, local authority officials 
as well as representatives of community organisations and of business - all within the 
Durban region - were canvassed. This section is written by Anthea Jeffery, Antoinette 
Louw and Charles Puttergill. 
Though the South African national political climate has undergone rapid change during 
the first three months of 1990, the reasons underpinning the expressed preferences for 
differing strategies remain, in my opinion, as valid this year as they were last year. 
Research was funded by the programme for Development Research (PRODDER) of the 
HSRC. I would like to thank the HSRC for its financial support and would like to state 
that opinions expressed in this Working Paper are those of the authors alone. 
SECTION 1. THE CHALLENGE OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN DURBAN 
(Simon Bekker) 
1. Local and metropolitan government 
One might begin by pointing to one of the essential characteristics of good local 
government: to match collective services to local needs. In order to do this, local 
government must satisfy a number of criteria. First, it must have adequate capacity or 
powers, including the power to raise and allocate revenue at local level. Secondly, it 
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must also be legitimate - so as to remain sensitive to local grievances and needs - which 
demands that it be both accepted by, and representative of, the community it purports to 
serve. Thirdly, it must be viable, meaning that it must have adequate financial resources 
and management skills, so that it can effectively and efficiently go about its business of 
service delivery. 
Finally, in a metropolitan region, each separate local government should be fairly 
and adequately integrated with others in a representative metropolitan authority, so as to 
streamline service delivery (including capital projects) to the metropolis as a whole. It 
must, moreover, be recognised that certain public services do show economies of scale, 
others do not. It makes sense for the metropolitan government to become responsible 
for the former, and local governments for the latter. 
Local government which fulfils these criteria is a particularly important institution, 
contributing significantly to both democracy and governmental efficiency. 
2. Local government in South Africa today. 
The present system of local government in South Africa falls far short of this 
ideal. It lacks adequate power. It lacks legitimacy (particularly in black communities) 
and its viability falls far short of what is required. In addition, the system of metropolitan 
government which is in the process of being implemented has major weaknesses, 
though it does also have some strengths. 
Before turning to Durban, we will first acknowledge the particular significance of 
local government in South Africa today, and then focus upon the system of metropolitan 
government which is being established in the country as a whole. 
Three very good reasons underlie the special significance of local government in 
the country. First, it is common wisdom that urbanisation is proceeding apace and 
bringing with it escalating demands for serviced land, residential units, adequate water, 
education, transport and health services. Those requiring these services are, and will 
remain, largely the urban poor: unable to afford, on an immediate cost-recovery basis, 
the services which are so vital. 
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Second, given this reality - coupled with the scale of need - it is evident that only 
the state has the resources to provide many of the services so urgently required. In 
addition, the state has already begun to acknowledge the inadequacy of its past 
provision and to recognise that it must do better in future. Critically, moreover, it is also 
beginning to recognise that it cannot properly achieve this goal without community 
participation. Community participation, however, lies usually beyond its grasp (a reality 
of which it is also increasingly aware). And, given the limited resources avaliable -
resources which contrast sharply with high aspirations - the difficult political decisions 
which must be taken, need to be taken within a participative context. 
Third, local governments and service delivery issues have been, over the past 
five years, at the centre of sustained conflict and confrontation between black 
communities country-wide and the South African government. The result is that city and 
local government in South Africa has become highly politicised and highly problematic -
posing a major managerial and developmental challenge. 
The issue of metropolitan government is raised when we turn to a recent 
innovation in the structure of local government: the introduction of Regional Services 
Councils (RSCs). These are intended to act as an extension of existing third-tier 
institutions and are responsible for 'general affairs' - ie the bulk (or 'wholesale') supply of 
hard services (such as water, electricity, sewerage, transport and planning) as well as 
the provision and maintenance of infrastructure in areas of 'greatest' need. The primary 
local authorities constituting an RSC remain responsible for 'own affairs', especially the 
reticulation (or 'retailing') of services to the household level. 
RSCs are intended to fulfill a three-fold function. According to the Department of 
Constitutional Planning and Development, they will promote efficiency and cost-
effectiveness through the rationalisation of sen/ice-provision; introduce a forum for multi-
racial decision-making; and generate substantial revenue (from two new levies on 
business) for the development of infrastructure in the areas of greatest need : viz., the 
black, coloured and Indian townships. 
A number of additional reasons underlie the introduction of RSCs. First, they 
provide a mechanism for 'transfer payments' to black, coloured and Indian local 
authorities, as recommended by the Browne and Croeser enquiries into local 
government finance. Second, they extend the principle of 'own and general affairs' from 
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Services Board. This JSB will differ in (at least) two significant respects from the RSCs 
created elsewhere: 
(a) it will cross the homeland boundary, drawing in local bodies from both Natal and 
KwaZulu. 
(b) it will be responsible, not to the tricameral parliament (via the appointed 
provincial administrator), but to the Joint Executive Authority, thus placing it in a 
potentially qualitatively different political position. 
Given the critical role of local government, coupled with the demographic 
realities earlier outlined, it is vital that the JSB be as effective, efficient and participative as 
possible. What strategies can be adopted to ensure that the JSB - to be established 
next year, in all probability - will meet the criteria and thus be of maximum benefit to the 
DFR? 
Three strategies are possible: 
Strategy 1: to oppose the establishment of a DFR-wide metropolitan body until 
an acceptable negotiated constitutional solution has been hammered out at national 
level. 
I believe that this strategy - which is perhaps the easiest to implement since it 
requires, at present, primarily protest political action - suffers from four flaws: 
since the time-scale involved is uncertain, the pressing developmental needs in 
the DFR (especially in its informal settlements) will be exacerbated in the interim; 
absence of action will probably allow the JSB (which will almost certainly be 
established in any event) to slide into a RSC-type body with the same flaws as 
earlier defined; 
valuable revenue which will be raised by the JSB may, in consequence, be used 
for less than effective purposes; 
this non-collaborationist stance may not, in fact, bring us closer to the generally 
accepted goal of a just and democratic society and city. 
Strategy 2: The DFR gives its own stamp to the JSB by exploiting the positive 
features of the RSC system and engineering changes to identified RSC flaws. 
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This strategy is undoubtedly more challenging and more difficult to implement. 
However, it should be recognised that there are a number of factors which would 
facilitate its successful implementation: 
(i) it would take place in a regional climate characterised by Indaba-type initiatives, 
and in a national climate in which the emphasis is being placed on negotiation 
and participation; 
(ii) it is possible to learn from RSC experience elsewhere and to emulate some of 
their positive steps, such as the creation, in the region, of community 
committees aimed at exposing RSCs to community perceptions and priorities; 
(iii) the JSB will be accountable to the Joint Executive Authority on which KwaZulu 
and Natal enjoy equal power and representation; 
(iv) it is evident that there is expertise available, coupled with significant willingness 
to participate in a JSB; 
There are also a number of requirements which need to be met if this strategy is 
to be successfully implemented. 
JSB participants need to be open to participative planning and decision-making; 
the JSB needs to be able to obtain sufficient funds for capital development, 
without too severely constraining economic development in the DFR; 
leaders within the JSB need to seek imaginative solutions to the challenges in 
the DFR, especially regarding its informal settlements; 
the DFR public need to be succinctly and simply informed of the nature, 
functions and significance of the JSB. 
Strategy 3: Accept an RSC-type structure in the DFR and in Natal/KwaZulu. 
If this strategy is followed, and the JSB becomes simply an RSC by another 
name, the following negative results will become apparent: 
(i) participation (and visibility of participation) will be insignificant; 
(ii) planning and activities will be concomitantly technicist; 
(iii) non-participative planning will provide, for the DFR's pressing developmental 
needs, at best short-term solutions; at worst, a series of planning disasters. 
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(iv) Finally, and most importantly, it must be remembered that this strategy (like the 
others) must be viewed in the context of on-going attempts at national 
constitutional negotiations. For this reason, a rigid and static RSC-type service 
delivery body stands a good chance of being 'left behind' politically: losing 
further credibilty and therefore viability as more advanced national constitutional 
structures are publicly discussed and begin to emerge. 
To conclude: 
I believe that strategy 2, rather than strategy 1 or strategy 3, will bring about in 
the DFR 
a greater measure of democratic participation; 
a redistribution of revenue wider in scope and more effective in application; and 
an improving quality of life for all residents of the rapidly growing city of Durban. 
It is my firm belief, moreover, that this process of transition must be an 
incremental process - one step at a time - rather than a sudden and radical change of 
local and metropolitan authorities. I say this since these authorities require, as a 
prerequisite, the continued involvement of experienced and often excellent managers 
and administrators who presently undertake the complex business of delivering public 
services to millions of Durban's residents. Let me also, however, immediately say - lest 
some interpret this statement as a plea for more time - that we need to take these 
incremental steps as rapidly as possible. We need to accelerate the process of 
incremental change, to push for one step to follow quickly upon another. 
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SECTION 2. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN THE DURBAN 
FUNCTIONAL REGION: ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 
(Anthea Jefffery, Antoinette Louw, Charles Puttergill) 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section of the paper is to examine options regarding the 
introduction of metropolitan government in the Durban Functional Region (DFR). 
The reasons for embarking on this assessment at this time are two-fold: 
Natal remains the 'last outpost', within the country, in that metropolitan 
government, in the form of Regional Services Councils (RSCs), has not yet been 
introduced within the province 
It is anticipated that metropolitan government will shortly be introduced in Natal, 
but it remains unclear precisely what form this will take. 
The reasons Natal has not yet witnessed the introduction of RSCs are fully 
described in a subsequent section. So too - within the limits of available information - is 
the form of metropolitan authority expected to be introduced in the province within the 
year. However, since the precise structure and functioning of this metropolitan authority 
remains as yet uncertain, there is a fluidity in the situation in Natal which is unique within 
South Africa. 
It has therefore seemed worthwhile to take advantage of this fluidity; and to 
canvass the views of a number of key authorities and organisations in the DFR, so as to 
ascertain their preferences regarding the type of metropolitan authority which ought to 
be introduced in the region. 
Before embarking on this analysis, however, some background material is 
necessary. Given the reality that any form of metropolitan authority in the DFR is likely to 
be modelled on RSCs elsewhere, some understanding of the RSC system is necessary. 
In addition, it is also important to recount the reasons Natal has resisted the introduction 
of RSCs to date. Thereafter, the methodology used in conducting this survey will be 
outlined, before shifting to the outcome of the research and the implications which it 
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holds for the introduction of a viable and legitimate system of metropolitan government in 
the DFR. 
2.1 The RSC system 
The Regional Services Councils Act was promulgated in 1985, as the outcome, 
inter alia, of a number of governmental enquiries which had focused primarily, on the 
problems of local government finance (the Browne Committee, the Croeser Working 
Group). The RSC system which emerged was intended, however, to address more than 
the problems of local government finance, important though this consideration 
remained. Thus, in the memorandum accompanying the RSC Bill, the purpose of the 
legislation was described as three-fold: 
to rationalise service provision through bulk supply 
to enable joint decision-making on matters of common concern 
to provide for infrastructural development in areas of 'greatest need' from new 
levies on employment and turnover. 
Underlying these stated aims, three underlying objectives were, however, also 
discernable: 
to overcome problems of fragmented service delivery - resulting from racially 
separate local authorities - and thus to improve the viability and hence legitimacy 
of newly established black local bodies, in particular 
to introduce the principle of own and general affairs - the cornerstone of the 
tricameral constitution of 1983 - at the local level, based on the concept that 
racially separate local bodies would remain responsible for culturally sensitive 
'own affairs' whilst the umbrella RSC would assume responsibility for 'general 
affairs' of common concern to all 
to address the urgent need for infrastructural development in black townships 
(which had been acknowledged as a contributing factor in the violence which 
erupted in 1984), whilst simultaneously limiting central government's 
responsibility for upgrading by identifying this as a third tier function. 
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2.2. Specific features of the RSC system 
The RSC system is a complex structure, full analysis of which lies outside the 
scope of this paper. For present purposes, it is intended to highlight ten specific 
features of the RSC system, which are particularly significant in its role and functioning. 
2.2.1. Representation from all racial groups 
Although originally intended to exclude blacks, RSCs now comprise 
representatives from all racial groups. These representatives are derived, in a manner 
further described in due course, from racially separate local bodies (white municipalities, 
coloured and Indian local affairs committees and black local authorities), within a given 
RSC region. 
Architects of the RSC system stress that the Act itself is 'colour-blind', making no 
reference to race. The racial character of RSCs stems thus from the fact that 
representatives are derived from 'own affairs' local authorities. 
2.2.2. Demarcation which presently excludes homeland areas 
Demarcation is primarily the responsibility of the provincial administrator ('the 
administrator'). He must, however, consult with local bodies affected and must also 
obtain the concurrence of specified local government ministers as well as the Minister of 
Constitutional Development and Planning (CDP). The Act provides guidelines for the 
delimitation of RSC regions, which emphasise common interest and cost-effectiveness in 
service provision. These, however, do not bind ministerial discretion in demarcation. 
Given the close proximity and interdependence of many homeland areas with 
core cities in the RSA (for example, Pretoria and Winterveld, East London and 
Mdantsane), the issue of homeland inclusion in RSC demarcation is a salient one. It is 
arguable that the Act provides for this by enabling the administrator to incorporate a 
homeland body within the initial demarcation of an RSC (provided the homeland has 
itself passed enabling legislation in this regard). In addition, it is clear that the Act allows 
an RSC, once established, to enter a 'service' agreement with a body outside its region 
(in either a self-governing or independent homeland). To date, however, no RSC as yet 
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established includes a homeland area, through either initial demarcation or subsequent 
agreement. 
2.2.3. Representation for informal settlements on RSCs 
Informal settlements are characterised by self-constructed 'shacks', often built 
from crates and corrugated iron. Local government in these areas is rudimentary and 
generally lacks formal authority. Instead, local leadership takes a variety of forms, being 
provided either by a mix of community-based organisations, local 'Big Men' or quasi-
traditional authorities. 
The problem posed by informal settlements is an urgent and a growing one. 
Though accurate figures are difficult to establish, it is clear that at least 2 million people in 
the country as a whole - unable to find shelter within existing overcrowded townships -
are living in informal settlements. 
The issue of representation for informal settlements on RSCs is accordingly a 
vital one. It is arguable that the Act makes provision for this, by enabling representation 
on RSCs not only for local authorities but also for management bodies and 
'representative' bodies. A 'representative' body is broadly defined as any body having at 
least one member elected by the community it serves. No definition of 'elected' is 
provided; and it is thus arguable that informal election, say, by show of hands at a public 
meeting, of a recognised leader in an informal settlement, would suffice. This 
interpretation would enable informal settlements to obtain both a voice and a vote, albeit 
limited, on RSCs. 
Thus far, however, no informal settlement has been accorded representation on 
an RSC. 
2.2.4. Representation on RSCs is indirect 
The members of an RSC are nominated by each participating local body, from 
among its own council members. Thus, RSC councillors are only indirectly elected by, 
and accountable to, the electorate of the region. This contrasts with the position in many 
other countries (such as Canada) where the representatives of a metropolitan authority 
are directly chosen by the community it is intended to serve. 
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2.2.5. The allocation of votes on RSCs 
The allocation of votes on RSCs depends on the value of services purchased by 
each participating local body from the RSC. This formula undoubtedly favours the 
wealthy (white) areas which tend to have a higher consumption of services such as 
electricity and water. However, the Act does seek to limit the dominance of such local 
authorities by excluding the service-consumption of industrial and business areas and by 
limiting the total voting power of any local body to 50percent. Thus, if any local body in 
an RSC region in fact purchases more than 50 percent of the services (say water and 
electricity) which the RSC provides, the excess over 50 percent is allocated, on a 
proportional basis, to other local bodies in the region. 
2.2.6. Decision-making on RSCs 
Decisions by an RSC require a two-thirds, rather than a simple, majority. This, 
again, is intended to guard against the dominance of RSC decisions by a limited number 
of powerful local bodies. 
The overarching aim, however, is to promote decision-taking by consensus as 
much as possible; and existing RSCs in other provinces take pride in the fact that few 
decisions have ever been put to the vote, most being adopted by consensus. 
Provision is also made for a participating local body to appeal against a decision 
of an RSC. Appeal lies, not to the courts, but to a specially constituted Appeals Board, 
comprising a number of central government ministers together with (except in financial 
matters) the provincial administrator. 
2.2.7. The role of the provincial administrator 
The role of the administrator is a pivotal one (Cameron in Heymans & Totemeyer, 
1988:53). Thus, to state but a few examples, the administrator is empowered to: 
delimit RSC boundaries 
determine RSC functions 
allocate voting power in certain circumstances 
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appoint RSC chairmen 
make regulations regarding RSC operation 
hear appeals from RSC decisions. 
In all instances, moreover, it must be remembered that the administrator acts, 
not on his own, but subject to the concurrence of designated central government 
ministers (notably the Ministers of Local Government in each House of Parliament and 
the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, together with, in some 
instances, the Minister of Finance). 
2.2.8. Bulk service delivery by RSCs 
One of the main purposes of RSCs is to enable economies of scale through bulk 
service provision. The Act provides for RSCs to undertake 21 listed functions as well as 
any other the administrator may allocate. It also provides for RSCs to deliver such 
services directly (through the transfer of requisite assets and personnel from 
participating local bodies) or through the appointment of agents. 
In general, to date, RSCs in other provinces have assumed comparatively few of 
their authorised functions of bulk service delivery (primarily water and electricity supply); 
and have generally tended to do so by appointing the core city in the region to act as 
agent. This has frequently resulted in a 'paper' change, as core cities previously 
responsible for supplying services to outlying local bodies have continued to do so, 
though now on behalf of the RSC. 
2.2.9. The raising of revenue by RSCs 
RSCs have been empowered to levy two new taxes. The first is the regional 
services levy (based on salaries) and the second is the regional establishment levy 
(based on turnover). Both are seen primarily as new taxes on business, though the state 
has emphasised that it is also subject to them. The provisions for collection of the levies 
are complex and have been provided for in special regulations. Initially, the rates of the 
levies were uniform for all RSCs (though this is not required by the Act) and is low (0,25 
percent for the services levy and 0,10 percent for the establishment levy). The rates of 
the levies are determined by each RSC, subject to the concurrence of the Minister of 
Finance. 
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2.2.10. The allocation of revenue by RSCs 
RSCs are empowered to allocate their revenue (derived primarily from the two 
new levies) to a limited number of functions. They are obliged, in terms of the Act, to 
allocate one twentieth of a percent of annual revenue to the Local Government Training 
Fund. Thereafter, they are permitted to allocate revenue to their own running costs, to 
those of their participant local bodies and to certain other purposes authorised by the 
Act or the administrator. However, in allocating revenue, they are obliged to give priority 
to the provision and maintenance of infrastructure in areas of 'greatest need'. 
Mo definition is provided of these areas; but it is commonly assumed by the 
architects of the RSC system that this formula denotes the black, coloured and Indian 
townships which are in urgent need of infrastructural development. 
2.3. The reasons for Natal's resistance to RSCs 
Although the DFR will be the last major metropolitan area in South Africa to 
acquire a metropolitan authority, this should not be seen as evidence of its opposition to 
metropolitanisation per se. On the contrary, as early as 1973, a guide plan for a Durban 
Metropolitan Area (DMA) had been published (by the Natal Town and Regional Planning 
Commission); and this served as a catalyst for the establishment, in 1977, of the Durban 
Metropolitan Consultative Committee (Metrocom). The aim of Metrocom was to foster 
liaison between local authorities in the region, with a view to optimising efficient and cost-
effective service delivery. 
In 1984, Metrocom released the results of a comprehensive report (by 
consultants Pim Goldby) on the financial implications of regionalisation of services in the 
DMA. Large savings were envisaged, as well as the attainment of minimum standards in 
all areas. The appointment of present service-delivery bodies as agents was 
recommended to minimise disruption and the growth of new bureaucracies. 
Though the government's reaction to the report was somewhat negative, it was 
nevertheless widely anticipated that Durban - with its practical experience of 
regionalisation - would be one of the first metropolitan regions to obtain an RSC. 
('Vaderland, 19.10.84, Daily News, 18.10.84 and Natal Witness, 10.5.85) 
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When an amended RSC Bill was published in 1985, it was initially accepted by 
white local officials and councillors and conservative Indian politicians. Metrocom 
recommended the establishment of an RSC in the area, on the assumption that KwaZulu 
areas would be included in the proposed boundary. 
Dissent from other quarters was, however, quickly voiced. In the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly, Chief Minister Buthelezi slated the proposed legislation. His 
reasons were complex but included, in particular: 
the government's failure to consult with KwaZulu and its attempt, instead, to 
impose a unilateral solution 
the key role played by the appointed provincial administrator, to the exclusion of 
KwaZulu authorities 
the RSC system of representation, based on racially separate local authorities 
the allocation of votes, in favour of wealthier (white) local authorities 
and 
the absence of representation for informal settlements. 
Organised business and commerce expressed their opposition to the new 
levies, based on the belief that these taxes would depress vital economic growth and 
contribute to inflation and growing unemployment. In addition, they subsequently 
emphasised that differences with KwaZulu and issues like undemocratic and inadequate 
representation had to be resolved. 
On closer scrutiny of the Bill, white local bodies became concerned about other 
aspects of the legislation. Questions were raised regarding: 
the need for Indian local affairs committees to assume autonomy to obtain 
representation 
the provision of representation for informal settlements 
the need for housing to be included as an RSC function 
the real benefits of regionalisation and whether it would realise the advantages 
envisaged 
the dominance of Durban, as 'Big Brother' and the possibility of forming a 
number of smaller RSCs. 
17 
Given KwaZulu's strenuous and sustained opposition, the implementation of 
RSCs in Natal was postponed. In 1987, Chief Minister Buthelezi called publicly on black 
local authorities to reject RSCs in Natal and for the enactment of alternative new 
legislation. Organised commerce and industry reiterated its opposition to 
implementation unless and until KwaZulu were included, pointing out that the levies 
would otherwise be passed on to black employees and consumers who would derive no 
compensatory benefit in infrastructural upliftment. 
By 1988, however, the attitude of the Natal provincial administration (N PA) had 
hardened. Boundary proposals, excluding KwaZulu, were published and action groups 
were established to assist the process of implementation. Notwithstanding KwaZulu's 
continued opposition, demarcation hearings were held in November 1988; and July 1989 
was announced as a target date for the establishment of RSCs in the province. 
The final boundaries for RSCs were announced in May 1989 and the 
appointment of the chairman of the Durban RSC was announced. Given the need, inter 
alia, to demarcate business and industrial areas, the target date for operation was 
shifted to October 1989. 
Chief Minister Buthelezi continued to voice his opposition to RSCs, whilst 
pointing out that the Joint Executive Authority (JEA) was finalising an alternative structure 
for the regionalisation of services, which would be acceptable to KwaZulu and would 
enable its cooperation. 
At the same time, there emerged a growing body of opinion that RSCs in Natal, 
excluding KwaZulu, would be an exercise in futility. This stemmed, in particular, from the 
fact that KwaZulu's exclusion would frustrate one of the most important purposes of 
RSCs: the development of infrastructure in areas of 'greatest need'. 
June 1989 witnessed a significant movement towards resolution of the impasse. 
The chairman and vice-chairman of the JEA (from the NPAand KwaZulu respectively) 
announced that an agreement had been reached, after protracted negotiations, on a 
draft bill providing an alternative model for metropolitanisation within Natal. The proposal 
for these new bodies - tentatively termed Joint Services Boards - had, however, to be 
ratified by the Natal and KwaZulu administrations, before being sent to Parliament for 
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enactment into law. The process envisaged was, accordingly, a lengthy one and it was 
tentatively suggested that the new bodies might become operational by mid-1990. 
The government then suspended the planned introduction of RSCs in Natal, but 
has since made it clear that this may still be carried into effect if the JSB proposals are 
rejected by Parliament. 
The bill providing for the introduction in Natal of Joint Services Boards has still to 
be published. It is confidently expected, however, that the new bodies will be closely 
modelled on the RSC system, subject to two major differences. Firstly, the pivotal role 
played by the administrator in the RSC system will instead be assumed by the JEA 
(which, of course, incorporates representatives from both KwaZulu and Natal). 
Secondly, the new metropolitan authorities will include local bodies in KwaZulu from the 
outset. In addition, it is possible that the ambiguous provision in the RSC Act (directing 
that priority be given to infrastructural development and maintenance in areas of 
'greatest need') may be more clearly worded. 
3. Survey of attitudes towards the metropolitan authority 
3.1. Methodology 
It was stated at the outset that the purpose of this study was to canvass the 
attitudes of key figures towards the metropolitan authority shortly to be introduced in the 
region. 
3.2. The respondents 
Four distinct categories of local-level actors having an interest 
in these developments were identified: 
local government officials, 
councillors, 
organised commerce and industry and 
extra-parliamentary organisations (supporting the Mass Democratic Movement 
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Extensive interviews were conducted with respondents from each of 
these categories. 
The Durban Functional Region (DFR) contains a diversity of local bodies. These 
are not only structured along racial lines but differ in size and in terms of the duties which 
they undertake. Local authorities under the control of the NPA differ in status. There are 
Boroughs, Town Boards, Town Committees, Health Committees and the City Council. 
Two Indian areas within the region have obtained burough status. Black townships 
under NPA control have not yet reached either town or city council status, in terms of the 
Black Local Authorities Act, 1982. The Development and Services Board is responsible 
for development areas and regulated areas. In trust land there is a township committee 
and a non-operative advisory board. The Indian and coloured local affairs committees 
are advisory structures. There are also certain urban areas, with no formal 
representation, which are served by the NPA. Local authorities in KwaZulu are 
controlled by the Department of the Chief Minister under proclamation 263/62 and are 
therefore subject to a different system of local government (Pistorius, 1989, pp. 1-3, 
Evans, 1988, pp. 52 and Bekker and Jeffery, 1987, pp. 3-5). 
A total number of 25 interviews were conducted with respondents from the 
above mentioned categories. Care was taken to ensure that these respondents 
represented a cross-section of the actors involved. Officials and councillors from various 
white local authorities, differing in status and powers, were interviewed. This approach 
was also applied to the autonomous Indian local bodies as well as the coloured and 
Indian local affairs committees. Black townships in KwaZulu and Natal were also 
included. Besides these actors, interviews were conducted with representatives from 
organised commerce and industry as well as Inkatha and prominent regional and 
metropolitan extra-parliamentary organisations supporting the MDM. 
3.3. The interview schedule 
Respondents were asked to evaluate ten central features of RSCs, indicating 
whether these were considered suitable or unsuitable for a metropolitan authority in the 
DFR. These features have already been discussed in the preceding section on RSCs 
and will only be listed here: 
a) representation from all racial groups 
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b) demarcation of boundaries in a manner excluding homelands 
c) the lack of representation for informal settlements 
d) indirect representation through nomination 
e) the weighted allocation of votes 
f) decision-making by two-thirds majority, with the emphasis on consensus 
g) the pivotal role of the provincial administrator 
h) bulk service delivery 
i) the raising of revenue, through two new levies 
j) the allocation of revenue, with priority required for infrastructural development in 
areas of greatest need. 
Respondents' views on these matters are important because it is expected, as 
earlier indicated, that the proposed Joint Services Board (JSB) will be closely modelled 
on the RSC system. 
Respondents were subsequently asked to evaluate the features of the JSB 
which are expected, at this point in time, to differ from the RSC system. These features, 
as earlier described, are two-fold: 
a) areas in KwaZulu will be included from the outset 
b) powers vested in the provincial administrator under the RSC system will instead 
be assumed by the JEA. 
In conclusion, respondents were asked to give their views on three possible 
options regarding the metropolitan authority to be introduced in the DFR. They were 
asked to evaluate each one and to indicate which, if any, they considered the most 
appropriate. If they did not support any of the options, they were asked to propose their 
own alternatives. 
The three options put to respondents were the following: 
a) accept a JSB which is effectively an RSC, with relatively minor differences. 
b) strive to remould the JSB in order to avoid the weaknesses of RSCs and build 
on their strengths (as earlier identified by respondents) 
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c) oppose the introduction of a JSB until national issues have been resolved. 
3.3. Process 
In the exploratory phase of the research, three interviews were conducted with 
senior officials (two retired) with extensive experience of local governmental matters in 
the province and especially the Durban region. The aim of this phase was to identify 
issues which needed further investigation, persons who could be approached for 
interview and secondary material which should be gathered. After the completion of the 
explanatory phase, the interview schedule was developed. Interviews were conducted 
during late 1989 and early 1990. 
4. Survey results 
4.1. Respondents' views on the suitability of specified RSC 
features for a metropolitan authority in the DFR 
The features on which respondents were asked to give their views have been 
briefly described in the section outlining the RSC system and have also been listed in the 
Methodology section. To recap, respondents were asked whether each of these 
features would be suitable or unsuitable for a metropolitan authority in the DFR. 
On analysis of respondents'replies, a number of broad themes emerge: and 
these will be highlighted in assessing responses regarding each feature. 
4.1.1 Representation from all racial groups, via racially separate local bodies 
In relation to this feature, two main themes emerged: 
The first is that representation from all racial groups and local bodies is essential 
to facilitate joint decision-making and establish priorities regarding areas of 'greatest 
need'. This would also help to foster cooperation, based on increased recognition of 
mutual economic interdependence. 
This theme was supported by the majority of officials and councillors 
interviewed. Some, however, whilst supporting the principle of representation for all 
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racial groups, also expressed reservations about its practical operation, pointing out 
that: 
the new metropolitan authority might become too large and develop an 
inefficient bureaucracy; and that 
representatives from black local bodies would, as a result of inexperience, be 
disadvantaged and require an initial orientation programme. 
In addition, this theme was supported by a representative of organised 
commerce and industry, who accepts the inclusion of all racial groups but objects to the 
effective exclusion of the business sector. This is considered unacceptable, as the bulk 
of revenue comes from levies on business, which ought therefore to be party to 
decision-making. 
The second theme is that racially defined groups and local bodies are 
unacceptable, as these perpetuate apartheid and sustain white domination in 
government. In addition, a racial base will engender mistrust and suspicion in black 
communities regarding a new metropolitan structure. 
This theme was expressed primarily by extraparliamentary groupings. However, 
it was also supported by one official, two councillors, the KwaZulu representative and a 
member of the organised business community, all of whom pointed out that the RSC 
system of representation is unacceptable, as it reflects an extension of the tricameral 
parliament to the third tier. 
4.1.2 Demarcation of boundaries to exclude homeland areas 
With one exception, all respondents were adamant that homeland exclusion 
would not be suitable in a metropolitan authority for the DFR. Reasons for this view 
differ, however, and may be captured in two broad themes (the first supported by the 
majority of respondents and the second by the extra-parliamentary groupings): 
The first theme is that a metropolitan authority would not be able to realise its 
goals (of infrastructural development in areas of greatest need and rationalised bulk 
service provision) if KwaZulu areas were to be excluded. The areas of greatest need lie 
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clearly in KwaZulu, and exclusion of the homeland would therefore undermine the 
credibility of the metropolitan authority before it even began its work. In addition, it 
would be unfair to exclude KwaZulu areas from decision-making, as these contribute to 
the overall income of the DFR. Furthermore, given the geographical intertwining of Natal 
and KwaZulu within the DFR, homeland exclusion would make bulk service delivery 
unmanageable. Finally, the exclusion of KwaZulu would lead to increased political 
problems, as unmet service needs and expectations in these areas would exacerbate 
tension and frustration. 
The second theme is that homelands are entirely unacceptable as they are not 
only designed to perpetuate apartheid but are also responsible for the problems of 
uneven development which third tier bodies now face. Accordingly, homelands should 
be abolished; and representation on the metropolitan authority should be accorded, 
without reference to this artificial distinction, to all who contribute to the growth of the 
area. 
The one respondent who doubted the suitability of including homelands in a 
metropolitan authority in the DFR is an official from a black local authority, with a council 
consisting predominantly of United Democratic Front (UDF) affiliated members. This 
respondent was concerned that, given present political conflict in Natal, these councillors 
would not wish to participate in a structure incorporating Inkatha supporters. 
4.1.3 The absence of representation for informal settlements on RSCs 
All respondents are clear that this would be unsuitable for a metropolitan 
authority in the DFR. Their reasons are primarily two-fold: 
i) informal settlements are most in need of infrastructural development and must 
therefore be included in the area of jurisdiction of the new metropolitan authority 
ii) representatives of informal settlements must be party to decision-making on 
upgrading, so as to clarify the priorities of residents. 
In addition, it was pointed out by the KwaZulu representative, that no area 
should be excluded from the metropolitan authority for political reasons. 
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Asked how representation should be accorded to informal settlements on a new 
metropolitan authority in the DFR, respondents were, however, divided in their views. A 
minority (of three informants) could proffer no suggestion as to how this should be done. 
The remainder raised a variety of proposals, reflected in the following three themes: 
i) as a temporary measure, each informal settlement should be represented on the 
metropolitan authority by the nearest local body, which should - in consultation 
with influential leaders or 'chiefs' - promote the interests of the settlement. In the 
long term, however, formal local authorities should be constituted in these areas. 
(This option was supported by more respondents (six) than any other). 
ii) no formal representation should be necessary, as an appointed spokesman or 
leader of the informal settlement could liaise between it and the metropolitan 
authority 
iii) informal settlements should be accepted as legal and, given their inherent ability 
to organise their own leadership, should be given their own local bodies. (This 
option was supported by extra-parliamentary and KwaZulu representatives). 
Finally, a warning was sounded by two officials that reliance should not be 
placed on the views of 'appointed' leaders, as there could be no guarantee that such 
leaders would have the support of their communities or best reflect their interests. 
4.1.4 Representation on RSCs is indirect, through nomination by 
participating local bodies 
The majority of respondents believe this RSC feature would be appropriate for a 
metropolitan authority for the DFR. However, KwaZulu and extraparliamentary 
representatives, together with one official and one councillor, believe that representation 
should be direct, with members of the metropolitan authority elected by the residents of 
the region. 
The reasons of those who support indirect representation are three-fold: 
i) councillors are already experienced in local government affairs, and are thus 
best qualified not only to serve on the metropolitan authority but also to choose 
who, from amongst their number, should do so 
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ii) ratepayers elect as councillors those whom they believe will promote their 
interests in their local area and can thus indirectly elect those who will best serve 
their interests on a metropolitan authority 
iii) members of the metropolitan authority must be thoroughly conversant with the 
affairs of participating local bodies; and confusion may arise if different sets of 
people serve on the metropolitan, and local, authorities. 
Reservations regarding indirect representation were expressed by two 
councillors, who did not, however, go so far as to reject the principle. Thus, one 
councillor pointed out that this could lead to the politicisation of local government, as 
members of the metropolitan authority might be chosen by local councils to promote the 
interests of particular political parties. In addition, it was pointed out that councillors 
have little time to devote to local affairs and would have even less for metropolitan 
matters, so that it might be better if metropolitan authority members were chosen 
specifically for this task. 
Indirect representation was rejected, as earlier indicated, by KwaZulu and 
extraparliamentary representatives, among others. This is primarily because biack local 
authorities, being racially based, lack legitimacy and credibility. Black councillors do not 
have community support and cannot truly act in the interests of the people they 
supposedly represent. Accordingly, representatives of the new metropolitan authority 
should instead be chosen by direct election, on a non-racial basis. 
4.1.5 The allocation of votes on RSCs, based on service-consumption 
and subject to a maximum of 50 percent 
Whilst some respondents regard this RSC feature as suitable for a metropolitan 
authority in the DFR, the majority reject it and propose alternative bases of vote-
allocation. 
Those in favour of vote-allocation on the basis of service-consumption point out 
the principal task of a metropolitan authority is to rationalise service-provision; and that it 
is appropriate that those areas which contribute the most financially in this regard should 
have the strongest decision-making power. 
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These respondents also support the 50 percent ceiling on voting power, which 
they believe will prevent any local body from becoming too powerful at the expense of 
poorer areas. 
The majority of respondents (including the KwaZulu and extra-parliamentary 
representatives) reject this method of allocating votes, for a variety of reasons: 
i) it favours the richer white areas and particularly the Durban City Council, which 
will be able to dominate decision-making on the metropolitan authority 
ii) it disadvantages poorer black areas which - though most in need of attention -
will have the least say on the metropolitan authority. 
Alternatives suggested are two-fold: 
i) each local body should have voting power on the metropolitan authority in 
proportion to its population 
ii) each local body should have one vote, irrespective of its population or service-
consumption. 
These respondents are also dissatisfied with the 50 percent maximum of voting 
power, believing that this will be ineffective in preventing the dominance of the Durban 
City Council (which will need the support of comparatively few other local bodies in order 
to attain the requisite two-thirds majority). Some respondents suggest that this 
maximum should be reduced, whilst others point out that the need for it would fall away if 
an alternative system of allocating votes were to be adopted. 
Two councillors expressed opposition to the RSC system of vote-allocation for a 
different reason, and put forward a concomitant alternative proposal. In their view, it is 
unfair to assess service-consumption by reference only to domestic usage. Indeed, 
since the industrial and business sectors will contribute most to the revenue of the 
metropolitan authority, they should tie entitled to participate in decision-making on the 
allocation of such revenue. These respondents accordingly suggest that votes should 
be allocated according to the total contribution made by each local body to the revenue 
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of the metropolitan authority. In addition, they believe that the 50 percent maximum will 
make little difference to the dominance of the Durban City Council and that it should 
therefore be reduced. 
4.1.6 Decision-making by two-thirds majority, 
if necessary, and ideally by consensus 
Whilst all respondents support the principle of decision-making by consensus, a 
minority are sceptical as to whether this can truly be achieved in an RSC-type system. 
The majority of respondents support consensus decision-making on the 
metropolitan authority to be established for the DFR as, by definition, it precludes 
dissatisfaction from any quarter. Opinions differ, however, as to whether such 
consensus would be possible: 
i) consensus has been reached by RSCs elsewhere and will also be attained in the 
DFR 
ii) consensus will be easy to achieve, as there will be many representatives to 
advise and inform each other 
iii) the attainment of consensus will depend on the commitment and attitude of 
members and the extent to which there is a common appreciation of the goals of 
the metropolitan authority. Further, should the authority become too large - and 
especially where it includes all race-groups - consensus might be difficult to 
reach. 
These respondents are satisfied that the requirement of a two-thirds majority for 
decisions, in the absence of consensus, is appropriate for a metropolitan authority in the 
DFR. One councillor, however, believes that a stricter majority should be required (on 
the basis that the more who favour a decision the better); whilst another is sceptical as to 
the utility of a two-thirds requirement, believing that the white local bodies will dominate 
decision-making in any event. 
The minority of respondents who, as earlier indicated, are sceptical as to 
whether consensus can truly be achieved in an RSC-type structure, comprise primarily 
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the KwaZulu and extra-parliamentary representatives. These submit that RSCs 
elsewhere have been able to attain the illusion of consensus because of both cooption 
and the white majority 'built in' by the system of vote-allocation. True consensus, 
however, could only be attained if all local bodies on the metropolitan authority 
established in the DFR were accorded an equal vote. If this were done, consensus 
would be unlikely (in the view of one respondent at least) and would depend on the 
extent of unanimity on the priorities of the metropolitan authority. 
This group of respondents is in favour of the two-thirds majority requirement, 
considering it a suitable democratic principle, on which all elections should be based. 
4.1.7 The pivotal role of the provincial administrator in 
many matters, including the appeal procedure 
Just over half of the respondents consider this RSC feature suitable for a 
metropolitan authority for the DFR. The new metropolitan body will require some 
overarching authority to arbitrate in the event of dissension among local bodies. An 
RSC-type appeal mechanism would be useful and some supervision of the authority 
would be necessary. It would, moreover, be better for this guiding role to be played by 
the provincial administrator, than by Pretoria, as the former is more sensitive to the 
needs of the DFR than the latter. 
However, it is interesting to note that even those who support this feature have 
strong reservations regarding the role of the administrator in the RSC system: 
i) more power should be devolved to local level and the administrator should 
consult with, and act on the advice of, the metropolitan council 
ii) the chairman of the metropolitan authority should be elected by the council, 
rather than appointed by the administrator, to ensure that he serves the interests 
of the former and not the latter. 
A number of respondents (comprising a few officials and councillors, the 
KwaZulu and one extra-parliamentary representative) oppose the role of the 
administrator. Interestingly, this group of respondents is also concerned about the 
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centralisation of power implicit in the administrator's role in the RSC system. Thus, 
respondents in this category stress that: 
i) central government controls the activities of local bodies through its appointed 
administrator; and that more power must be devolved to local level 
and that 
ii) excessive controlling power is vested in the administrator in the RSC system; 
and it would be preferable instead to establish a committee to vote on important 
issues, to provide for an elected chairman and to ensure that the administrator's 
role is limited to coordination. 
These respondents also believe that, whilst an appeal mechanism is valuable in 
principle, the RSC-type system would be inappropriate as the administrator would 
ultimately act in the interests of central government. 
Reservations and criticisms outlined so far all reflect concern with centralisation 
of power. Another broad category of concern is the possible politicisation of local 
government through the role of the administrator in an RSC-type system. 
Respondents who voiced this latter concern pointed out that: 
i) the administrator is effectively appointed by the National Party and may be 
expected to promote its interests 
ii) the administrator has little credibility because he is a political appointee and 
cannot be expected to depart from National Party policy (the KwaZulu 
representative) 
iii) the administrator in the RSC system is yet another mechanism through which 
the National Party controls local authorities, in its attempt to retain white 
domination at all tiers of government (extra-parliamentary representatives). 
4.1.8 Bulk service delivery by RSCs 
With the exception of one councillor, all respondents consider this RSC feature 
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appropriate for a metropolitan authority in the DFR. 
Respondents believe, moreover, that such service delivery Should be provided 
through agents, for the following reasons: 
i) this will help preclude the growth of a large and inefficient bureaucracy at 
metropolitan level 
ii) existing expertise in service delivery will be better utilised, thus contributing to 
the success of metropolitanisation. 
Other proposals made by respondents include: 
i) the role of the metropolitan authority should be to coordinate and manage the 
distribution of resources by local agents 
ii) the decision on which services to regionalise should be made by the 
metropolitan authority, rather than the provincial administrator 
iii) care must be taken to ensure a balance between the needs of the poor and the 
affluent in deciding on service delivery (the KwaZulu representative) 
iv) the metropolitan authority must strive for maximum economies of scale, so as to 
reduce the cost of services, in the interests of poorer consumers especially (the 
KwaZulu and extra-parliamentary representatives) 
v) not all services should be regionalised, as some can be more cheaply provided 
on a smaller geographic scale 
vi) complications may arise where the responsibility of the metropolitan authority 
overlaps with that of the NPA, (for example, regarding roads). 
The councillor who has reservations regarding bulk service delivery by the 
metropolitan authority points out that it is economically unsound to disrupt a system 
which is operating well. In his view, the role of the metropolitan authority should 
accordingly be limited to planning and coordinating the delivery of services by local 
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authorities already responsible for these functions. (He is also concerned that 
regionalisation will lead to down-grading of the status of his local body). 
All respondents agree that the first services to be regionalised should be basic 
services such as water, sewerage and electricity, followed by roads, refuse removal and 
fire prevention. One respondent believes planning is an important metropolitan function, 
whilst another proposes that the metropolitan authority undertake the provision of 
housing. 
4.1,9 The raising of revenue by RSCs through new levies on 
salaries and turnover 
Just over half the respondents support this RSC feature for a metropolitan 
authority for the DFR; whilst many believe this would be inadvisable, as it will inhibit 
economic growth. 
Those in favour of this feature (primarily officials and councillors) cite three main 
reasons: 
i) the levies will be passed on, through price increases in commodities, to a 
broader spectrum of the community than would be the case if GST were instead 
increased 
ii) central government does not have the revenue for upgrading, and it is 
appropriate that this burden should be assumed by the private sector, which 
should be willing to make a contribution to the welfare of the working community 
iii) the only real alternative is an increase in GST; and this should be avoided at all 
costs, as GST is already too high. 
Those who reject the levies comprise primarily the business sector, as well as 
the representatives of KwaZulu and the extra-parliamentary organisations. Their reasons 
include: 
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i) there will be widespread tax evasion, especially by smaller businesses, with the 
result that the burden will fall primarily on more established businesses 
ii) collection of the levies will be complex and require a considerable bureaucracy, 
which will absorb much of the revenue obtained 
iii) the turnover levy, in particular, is inequitable, as it will fall particularly hard on 
businesses with high turnover but low profits 
iv) the levies will be passed on to the consumer, thus fuelling inflation 
v) the levies will retard economic growth and increase unemployment (especially 
the levy on salaries) 
vi) the country is already overtaxed; and the solution lies in re-allocating resources 
at national level, rather than expecting local government to compensate for the 
central state's incompetence 
Two subsidiary points were also made, the first by a representative of organised 
commerce and industry and the second by a member of an extra-parliamentary 
organisation: 
i) the passing on of the levies through price increases will affect not only national 
but also international markets and may thus inhibit the country's balance of 
trade 
ii) an alternative source of revenue is for local authorities (such as the Durban City 
Council) to be less wasteful in their expenditure; thus generating savings which 
could be used for the areas most in need. 
4.1.10 Redistribution of revenue by RSCs, through infrastructural development In 
areas of 'greatest need' 
All respondents support this RSC feature for a metropolitan authority for the 
DFR. This is because of the apparent need of poor areas for upgrading, coupled with 
the perception that this should be a primary aim of a metropolitan authority. 
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Other points made by respondents supporting this principle include: 
i) the development of poor areas will be beneficial not only per se but also 
because it will lead to the expansion of commerce and industry 
ii) the question as to which areas are most in need is complex; and a detailed 
study of the region will be necessary to prioritise requirements. 
Some reservations, however, were also expressed: 
i) a councillor pointed out that residents of poor areas should not develop a 
mentality of expecting handouts; but should be prepared to contribute to 
development and ultimately to the revenue of the region 
ii) an official expressed concern that equal upgrading of all areas will not be 
possible and that this may give rise to conflict 
iii) extra-parliamentary representatives believe that an RSC type provision (directing 
that priority be given to infrastructurai development in areas 'most in need 
therefore') would not suffice to guarantee the upgrading of black areas; and 
propose that the obligation to do so be more clearly stated, and entrenched. 
In addition, two councillors have doubts as to whether redistribution in this 
manner will succeed: 
i) local authority representatives on a metropolitan body will inevitably try to divert 
revenue to their own areas 
ii) decisions on upgrading may be taken on an ad hoc basis, whereas what is 
necessary is detailed planning over a substantial period of time 
iii) development of poorer areas is essential for peace and stability; but - given the 
extent of black frustration and scepticism regarding governmental initiatives -
may already be 'too little, too slow and too late'. 
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4.2. Respondents's views on the suitability of proposed 
specific differences in the JSB 
As earlier outlined, it is now probable that Natal will obtain another form of 
metropolitan authority (the Joint Services Board or JSB), similar in most respects to an 
RSC but differing in two important ways. In this section, respondents' views on these 
proposed specific differences are canvassed. 
4.2.1 Demarcation to include KwaZulu areas from the outset 
All respondents believe this would be appropriate in a metropolitan authority for 
the DFR. There is, however, some difference in standpoint between extra-parliamentary 
and other representatives; and these are accordingly separately outlined. 
Extra-parliamentary representatives support the inclusion on a metropolitan 
authority of all communities which form a part of the metropolitan region and have 
accordingly contributed to its growth. They are opposed, however, to the very concept 
of homelands and thus reject a distinction between Natal and KwaZulu. Instead, the 
emphasis should be on building a single nation and representation on a metropolitan 
authority should be geared towards this goal. 
Other respondents cite a variety of reasons for supporting KwaZulu inclusion: 
i) representatives of the business community stress that they have relentlessly 
campaigned for such inclusion, as KwaZulu areas are an integral part of the 
DFR, contributing to the labour of the region and housing a significant 
percentage of its consumers. KwaZulu and Natal are intimately intertwined, 
generating an economic interdependence which transcends artificial boundaries 
and requires recognition of its reality 
ii) the inclusion of KwaZulu areas in a metropolitan authority in the DFR would be a 
logical extension of the liaison already established at provincial level through the 
JEA. Moreover, liaison at local level is especially important; and it is vital that all 
communities be included in the decision-making process 
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iii) such inclusion is essential if the metropolitan authority is to realise the goal of 
infrastructurai development in areas of 'greatest need'. Such areas lie mainly in 
KwaZulu; and their inclusion is necessary not only to allow upliftment but also to 
preclude the friction which would otherwise result 
iv) KwaZulu inclusion is also essential to the attainment of the goal of coordinated 
bulk service delivery, as fragmentation would otherwise remain. 
4.2.2 The pivotal role of the provincial admininstrator, 
in the RSC system, allocated instead to the JEA 
Whilst the majority of respondents believe this proposal would be appropriate for 
a metropolitan authority in the DFR, some reject it and one (a Local Affairs committee 
councillor) believes that the RSC-type role of the administrator should be retained. 
The majority of respondents are satisfied that the JEA is the most suitable body, 
under present circumstances, to play a supervisory role in relation to a metropolitan 
authority for the DFR. Reasons cited include: 
i) since the JEA incorporates KwaZulu representatives, it would enable input from 
KwaZulu which would otherwise be lacking and which would be particularly 
important given the inclusion of KwaZulu areas in the metropolitan authority 
ii) since the JEA incorporates a number of different individuals, the danger of 
arbitrary decision-making would be reduced 
iii) the fact that the JEA operates on consensus is positive and will give increased 
legitimacy to its decisions 
iv) the JEA may be perceived as politically neutral, since it incorporates all race 
groups, does not comprise particular parties and has a rotating chairman 
v) it is preferable that the supervisory role be exercised at regional rather than 
national level as this will result in more informed decisions, with greater 
consultation with local bodies concerned. 
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Some reservations were, however, also expressed: 
i) the JEA is not elected and needs to become more representative, especially as 
its present incumbents are not accepted by large numbers of blacks and Indians 
ii) once the metropolitan authority has been established, the role of the JEA should 
be limited to the appeal procedure, leaving the metropolitan body free to chart 
its own course. 
One Local Affairs committee councillor, by contrast, saw no need for the 
supervisory role to be allocated to the JEA rather than the provincial administrator. In his 
view, all that is necessary is that the latter should consult with all interested parties. 
Extra-parliamentary representatives reject the suggested role of the JEA. Their 
main reason is that: 
i) both the Natal and KwaZulu authorities which comprise the JEA are illegitimate. 
The substitution of the JEA for the administrator is therefore no improvement. A 
more widely repesentative body is needed, especially in the light of the conflict in 
the region. 
Similar views were expressed by another Local Affairs committee councillor, who 
pointed out that the JEA might have been suitable if it had been introduced earlier, 
before violence erupted in Natal. Given the present conflict between Inkatha and the 
United Democratic Front, it is clear that the JEA is not acceptable to a significant 
percentage of DFR residents. A more broadly based supervisory body is therefore 
essential. 
4.3. Respondents' views regarding strategies 
towards metropolitanisation 
In conclusion - and given the likelihood of the introduction of a JSB in the DFR in 
the near future - respondents were asked to give their views on three possible strategies 
and to indicate which, if any, they regarded as most appropriate. 
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4.3.1 Accept the introduction of a JSB, which is effectively an RSC 
(subject to the two changes outlined in the preceding section) 
This option is supported by most white officials, some of whom, however, 
qualified their stance by expressing the need for evolutionary change, over time. 
Representatives of business, KwaZulu, extra-parliamentary organisations and most 
councillors, however, rejected it. 
Officials who support this option cite, inter alia, the following reasons: 
i) RSCs have progressed too far in other provinces for Natal, realistically, to blaze 
its own trail 
ii) RSCs in other provinces are succeeding in their objectives and an RSC-type JSB 
would be able to do the same in the DFR 
iii) Given existing backlogs in infrastructurai development, it would be selfish to 
delay the implementation of a body which could begin to address these 
problems 
iv) Natal has already lost millions in revenue, which could have been raised for 
infrastructurai development 
v) the JSB is supported by KwaZulu, thus removing the major obstacle to 
implementation 
vi) the RSC-type JSB offers certainty and immediate tangible benefits 
vii) an RSC-type JSB offers a unique opportunity to rationalise services and 
redistribute revenue; and is an important interim step towards an integrated 
metropolitan region. 
Some of these respondents did, however, express reservations regarding an 
RSC-type JSB, particularly as regards representation and administration. They 
acknowledged that these and other deficiencies would need to be addressed, but 
stressed that this should be done gradually, over time. 
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Some councillors supported this option, for reasons similar to those of the 
officials. Thus, they pointed out that the JSB has the backing of KwaZulu, that upgrading 
is urgently required and that further delay should not be brooked. However, they also 
acknowledged the imperfections in the RSC-type JSB and acknowledged that changes 
would be necessary in the future. 
Representatives of organised commerce and industry are opposed to this 
option. Reasons given include: 
i) the government's acknowledgement that Natal is different and requires an 
alternative provides an important opportunity to benefit from the experience of 
RSCs elsewhere and seek to avoid their pitfalls 
ii) acceptance of this option would imply that the JSB is adequate as a 
metropolitan authority, whereas this is not the case. 
Extra-parliamentary representatives reject the first option emphatically, on the 
basis that they cannot participate in such a government-created structure. In addition, 
they point out that their communities could - in any event - have little influence on an 
RSC-type JSB, because of the system of voting and representation. 
Black officials, an Indian official and some white officials also reject this option, 
pointing out that an RSC-type JSB would be too rigid and incapable of catering for the 
volatile situation in the DFR. 
4.3.2 Strive to re-mould the JSB, so as to avoid the 
weaknesses of the RSC system and build on its strengths 
This option was supported by a majority of councillors. It was seen as offering 
the best of both worlds, enabling the implementation of a metropolitan authority with a 
mandate to uplift poor areas, whilst also allowing for adaptations and improvements to 
be made. Moreover, teething problems were inevitable and would need to be ironed 
out. The emphasis, however, should be on flexibility and on keeping the JSB in line with 
current thinking. 
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Similar thinking was expressed by those officials (mainly black and some white) 
who oppose the first option. This strategy is seen as offering the advantage of reaping 
the immediate benefits linked to a JSB, whilst also catering for necessary improvements. 
This would be in line with the strategy of incremental change being followed at national 
level, and would offer the opportunity to bring about reform from within. 
Representatives of organised commerce and industry also support this option. 
It offers the opportunity to take advantage of Natal's unique situation (being the only 
province in which an alternative to RSCs is being envisaged) and to seek to obtain the 
maximum benefit from metropolitanisation. Although an RSC-type JSB would be an 
important development, the gains it offers can not only be obtained but can also be 
strengthened by following this second option. 
Extra-parliamentary representatives point out that this option would also involve 
their participation in a government-created structure. Their preference, accordingly, is 
for yet another alternative, which may be analysed as falling somewhere between the 
second and third options (as further described in due course). 
4.3.3 Oppose the introduction of a JSB until national 
issues have been resolved 
This option is generally rejected by respondents. Officials, in particular, 
emphasise that upgrading is critically required and cannot be delayed until national 
issues have been resolved. Similar views were expressed by most councillors and by 
representatives of organised commerce and industry. 
The third option is, however, supported by two Local Affairs Committee 
councillors. They point out that the first and second options are likely to yield only limited 
returns. The Indian local affairs committee system has been in place for nineteen years, 
but has witnessed little significant change; whilst there has also been considerable 
frustration in working within this government-created structure. Moreover, the 
government is now prepared to negotiate with the ANC on a more democratic 
constitution; and it would be inadvisable, especially in the present climate of change, to 
introduce new structures with limited legitimacy. In addition, existing third-tier authorities 
should rather be reformed, so as to attain the goal of non-racial local government. 
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Extra-parliamentary representatives expressed support for an alternative 
approach, somewhere between the second and third options. These respondents do 
not support a period of inaction, whilst awaiting change at national level. On the 
contrary, they are actively involved in mobilising their communities and increasing their 
awareness of issues. In addition, they seek to improve conditions and services in black 
areas and strive to achieve this by working outside the system. This does not mean 
non-collaboration only, however. They have had contact with local bodies at various 
times; and are willing to engage in a search for alternatives which would result in an 
appropriate metropolitan authority for the DFR. 
5. Conclusions 
This survey highlights the importance of a metropolitan authority for the DFR. It 
shows also that key figures in local government in the region have a number of 
significant reservations regarding an RSC-type body. It is therefore clear that, although 
the two changes mooted in the JSB (the inclusion of KwaZulu areas and the substitution 
of the JEA for the administrator) are broadly welcomed as improvements, there are a 
number of other features of the RSC system which are not considered suitable for a 
metropolitan authority in the DFR. 
Moreover, whilst most white officials support the immediate introduction of a JSB 
for the tangible benefits in upgrading it would bring, even these respondents are 
sensitive to the need for further change. Black officials, the majority of councillors and 
the representatives of organised commerce and industry believe that every attempt must 
be made to remould the JSB, so as to avoid the weaknesses of the RSC system and 
build on its strengths. Extra-parliamentary organisations, representing a significant 
constituency in the DFR, are opposed to a JSB in either RSC or modified form; and 
prefer instead to negotiate alternatives with local opinion-makers and decision-takers. 
These findings underlie the need for further investigation, discussion and 
negotiation: aimed at achieving an acceptable and appropriate metropolitan authority for 
the DFR. Moreover, given the recognition - even by the state - that race can no longer 
be used as an organising principle, such a system of metropolitan government must be 
based on participating local authorities reflecting spatial rather than racial representation. 
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The need for such investigation, discussion and negotiation is an urgent one; for 
not only are existing needs for service rationalisation and upgrading acute, but legislation 
providing for a JSB is already in the pipeline and, once enacted, will constitute a fait 
accompli more difficult to modify. 
APPENDIX: 
SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 
1 Retired senior Municipal official: 22.5.89 in Durban. 
2 Retired senior NPA official: 23.5.89 in Durban. 
3 Senior NPA official: 26.5.89 in Pietermaritzburg. 
4 Official, white local authority: 20.11.89 in Durban. 
5 Official, white local authority: 20.11.89 in Durban. 
6 Official, white local authority: 21.11.89 in Durban 
7 Official, white local authority: 21.11.89 in Durban. 
8 1 st representative of the business community: 22.11.89 in Durban. 
9 2nd representative of the business community: 22.11.89 in Durban. 
10 Councillor, white local authority: 23.11.89 in Durban. 
11 Official, white local authority: 27.11.89 in Durban. 
12 Official, white local authority: 27.11.89 in Durban. 
13 Councillor, white local authority: 28.11.89 in Durban. 
14 Official, black local authority: 29.11.89 in Durban. 
15 Councillor, white local authority: 29.11.89 in Durban. 
16 Official, black local authority: 30.11.89 in Durban. 
17 Official, Indian local authority 1.12.89 in Durban. 
18 Official, KwaZulu authority: 4.12.89 in Durban. 
19 Councillor, local affairs committee: 6.12.89 in Durban. 
20 Councillor, white local authority: 6.12.89 in Durban. 
21 Councillor, local affairs committee: 7.12.89 in Durban. 
22 Official, black local authority: 8.12.89 in Durban. 
23 Councillor, white local authority: 13.12.89 in Durban. 
24 Retired official, indial local authority: 18.1.90 in Northern Durban. 
25 Councillor, black local authority: 19.1.90 in Durban. 
26 Representative from an extra-parliamentary group: 20/1.90 in Durban. 
27 Representative from extra-parliamentary group: 22.1.90 in Durban. 
28 Councillor, local affairs committee: 23.1.90 in Durban. 
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